Counterpart theory and rigid designators Counterpart theory

1 counterpart theory , rigid designators

1.1 arguments inconstancy
1.2 counterpart theory compared qua-theory , individual concepts
1.3 counterpart theory , epistemic possibility

counterpart theory , rigid designators

kripke interpreted proper names rigid designators rigid designator picks out same object in every possible world (kripke 1980). accepts contingent identity statements following semantic problem occurs (semantic because deal de dicto necessity) (rea 1997:xxxvii).

take scenario mentioned in paradox of coincidence. statue (call “statue”) made melding 2 pieces of clay together. 2 pieces called “clay”. statue , clay seem identical, exist @ same time, , incinerate them @ same time. following seems true:

(7) necessarily, if statue exists statue identical statue.

but,

(8) necessarily, if statue exists statue identical clay

is false, because seems possible statue have been made out of 2 different pieces of clay, , identity clay not necessary.

counterpart theory, qua-identity, , individual concepts can offer solutions problem.

arguments inconstancy

ted sider gives following argument (sider 2001:223). there inconstancy if proposition essence of object true in 1 context , false in another. c-relation similarity relation. similar in 1 dimension not similar in dimension. therefore, c-relation can have same difference , express inconstant judgements essences.

david lewis offers argument. paradox of coincidence can solved if accept inconstancy. can possible dishpan , piece of plastic coincide, in context. context can described using ct.

sider makes point david lewis feels forced defend ct, due modal realism. sider uses ct solution paradox of material coincidence.

counterpart theory compared qua-theory , individual concepts

we assume contingent identity real. informative compare ct other theories how handle de re representations.

qua-theory

kit fine (1982) , alan gibbard (1975) (according rea 1997) defences of qua-theory. according qua-theory can talk of object s modal properties. theory handy if don t think possible socrates identical piece of bread or stone. socrates qua person person.

individual concepts

according rudolf carnap, in modal contexts variables refer individual concepts instead of individuals. individual concept defined function of individuals in different possible worlds. basically, individual concepts deliver semantic objects or abstract functions instead of real concrete entities in ct.

counterpart theory , epistemic possibility

kripke accepts necessity of identity agrees feeling still seems possible phospherus (the morning star) not identical hespherus (the evening star). know, different. says:

what, then, intuition table might have turned out have been made of ice or of else, might have turned out not made of molecules, amount to? think means there might have been table looking , feeling 1 , placed in position in room, in fact made of ice, in other words, (or conscious being) have been qualitatively in same epistemic situation in fact obtains, have same sensory evidence in fact have, table made of ice. situation akin 1 inspired counterpart theorists; when speak of possibility of table turning out made of various things, speaking loosely. table not have had origin different form 1 in fact had, in situation qualitatively identical 1 respect evidence had in advance, room have contained table made of ice in place of one. counterpart theory applicable situation, applies because not interested in might not true of table given evidence. precisely because not true table might have been made of ice thames must turn here qualitative descriptions , counterparts. apply these notions genuine de re modalities, present standpoint, perverse. (kripke 1980:142.)

so explain how illusion of necessity possible, according kripke, ct alternative. therefore, ct forms important part of our theory knowledge of modal intuitions. (for doubt strategy, see della roca, 2002. , more knowledge of modal statements, see gendler , hawthorne, 2002.)